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  1 
Natural logarithm: Response to Cantlon 
 
The performance of the Mundurucu on the number-space task may exemplify a general 
competence  for  drawing  analogies  between  space  and  other  linear  dimensions,  but 
Mundurucu  participants  spontaneously  chose  number  when  other  dimensions  were 
available.  Response  placement  may  not  reflect  the  subjective  scale  for  numbers,  but 
Cantlon et al.’s proposal of a linear scale with scalar variability requires questionable 
additional hypotheses. 
 
We agree with Cantlon et al., that the performance of the Mundurucu on the number-line 
task could exemplify a more general capacity for analogical reasoning that allows mappings 
between space and other linear dimensions. The mapping of number to space is surely not the 
only mapping available to the human mind, and indeed, one of our earlier papers provided 
evidence that the Mundurucu spontaneously relate large-scale 3D spatial layouts to small 2D 
geometric forms, using the latter as literal maps (1). Humans may well possess a generic 
capacity to think of all quantities, be they distances, object sizes or any other continuous 
dimension, as fundamentally commensurate and assessable by a single measurement system 
(real numbers).  Nevertheless, the appeal to analogy begs the crucial question of whether 
some stimulus dimensions are privileged when mapping stimuli onto space. In our study, the 
target sets varied on multiple dimensions including element size, brightness, average area, and 
number, and each of these dimensions could have been mapped onto space. The two training 
trials provided insufficient instruction or feedback to fully distinguish between these possible 
mappings.  Still,  the  Mundurucus  spontaneously  selected  number  as  the  main  dimension 
underlying  their  pointing  responses.  This  systematic  pattern  provides  evidence  that  the 
mapping of number to space is intuitive and privileged. RUNNING HEAD: RESPONSE TO LOG OR LINEAR 
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Is  the  subjective  scale  of  number  logarithmic  or  linear?  On  this  issue,  Cantlon  et  al. 
propose an alternative interpretation of our findings. Although the number-line responses of 
the Mundurucu are logarithmically spaced, their internal representation of number would be 
linear,  with  equal  psychological  distance  between  adjacent  numbers,  but  with  linearly 
increasing variability.  Cantlon et al.’s suggestion runs counter to the simplest construal of 
number line placements as indicators of psychological distance.  On this standard construal (2, 
3), participants evaluate the size of the numbers and place them at spatial distances relative to 
the end points that are proportional to their psychological distances from those endpoints. The 
challenge for the hypothesis of a linear code with scalar variability is to formulate even what 
it  would  mean  to  possess  a  linear  psychological  distance  metric,  and  yet  respond 
logarithmically in a test as simple as ours. 
Cantlon et al. rise to this challenge by supposing that the number line task is not as simple 
as it seems, but involves “a ratio comparison process between the anchors and the probe 
values”. This means that participants do not report the psychological distance between each 
probe number and the anchors (i.e. their difference, which would be linear), but the similarity 
between them (which takes into account their internal variability, and hence varies with their 
ratio).  In  brief,  on  this  account,  the  Munduruku  would  base  their  spatial  responses  on 
perceived number similarity, all the while possessing a linear sense of psychological distance. 
This  account  is  problematic  for  several  reasons.  First,  it  depends  on  the  questionable 
assumption  that  perceived  similarity  can  be  finely  evaluated  quantitatively,  not  only  at 
threshold but also well above threshold (since quantities such as 3 are easily discriminable 
from both 1 and 10 even for infants). Second, this account posits two internal metrics, one of 
similarity and a distinct one of psychological distance, with the peculiar assumption that, in 
spite of what the term “distance” implies, the second one is not easily mapped onto space. RUNNING HEAD: RESPONSE TO LOG OR LINEAR 
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Third, this account provides no explanation for the changes in task performance that occur 
with inter-cultural contact or education, without additional assumptions that are either highly 
implausible or demonstrably false. In our experiments, Mundurucu participants who could 
count in Portuguese showed linear responding with Portuguese number words but logarithmic 
responding with dot stimuli and with Mundurucu number words. In other experiments using 
this task (2, 3), young children in U.S. elementary schools showed linear performance with a 
number line scaled from 1 to 100 but logarithmic performance at larger scales. To account for 
these performance patterns, Cantlon et al. might propose that bilingual Mundurucu adults and 
U.S.  school  children  learned  to  construe  the  number  line  task  differently.  But  if  these 
participants somehow learned that the task required mapping of psychological distance when 
the stimuli were Portuguese words or small numbers, and if they were endowed with a linear 
sense of numerical distances, then why did they fail to apply this mapping more broadly? 
Alternatively, Cantlon et al. could propose that the similarity relations among numbers change 
during development, as the linear code with scalar variability is replaced by a linear code with 
fixed variability. While such a developmental change may occur, a large amount of data from 
numerosity discrimination (4), non-verbal arithmetic (5, 6), magnitude estimation (7), and 
subjective similarity reports of symbolic numerals (8) shows that even in educated adults, 
number similarity still varies with numerical ratio or, equivalently, logarithmic distance. We 
therefore stand by the original hypothesis (2, 3, 9): young children begin with a logarithmic 
sense of number, and education subsequently provides an additional linear representation, 
suitable for mapping numbers onto space, but which does not however totally supplant the 
logarithmic representation in all tasks (9-11). 
Since Fechner, Weber and Stevens, the issue of the mapping from objective to subjective 
quantity  has  become  increasingly  technical.  Cantlon  et  al.  correctly  point  out  that  the 
logarithmic code and the linear code with scalar variability often make identical behavioral RUNNING HEAD: RESPONSE TO LOG OR LINEAR 
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predictions, because both predict ratio-based numerical discrimination. The two models are 
not, however, empirically indistinguishable. A subtle but distinctive prediction concerns the 
shape of the internal noise: according to the logarithmic hypothesis, it should be Gaussian on 
a log scale, and therefore the distribution should be rightward skewed when plotted on a linear 
scale.  Conversely,  in  some  carefully  designed  situations  (departing  from  a  mere 
discrimination) the linear model predicts a Gaussian distribution of responses on a linear 
scale,  and  therefore  a  leftward  skewed  distribution  on  a  log  scale.  Several  studies  have 
attempted to characterize the noise distribution for number, either behaviorally (11) or, most 
crucially, with methods that directly probe the neural code for numerosity in monkeys and 
humans (12, 13). All results so far support the logarithmic model. 
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